Approved For Releas 2007/01/31 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000300300007-0


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11 April 1952

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OCI No. 5600
Copy No. 53

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM



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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

State Dept. review completed



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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intensified "peace campaign" gives no indication of Soviet policy change:

The Communist "peace campaign" is an ever-present part of Soviet diplomacy. It is intensified periodically as the USSR finds it expedient.

Since the mid-February London and Lisbon meetings of the Western powers, signs of an expanding "peace campaign" have multiplied. The Kremlin has increased its efforts to create the illusion that the USSR is ready to settle reasonably its differences with the West. The 10 March and 9 April Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty, two Stalin interviews in early April, and the speciously liberal atmosphere of the Moscow Economic Conference of 3 to 12 April contribute to the same general pattern.

There is still no evidence that the Kremlin is seeking a relaxation of world tensions on any but its own terms or that it intends to make significant concessions. The 9 April answer to the Western notes on Germany, which provided a test in this regard, gave no hint that Moscow considers a real compromise possible or desirable. The Soviet Union proposed four-power discussions of free all-German elections for the first time, but in no way committed itself to bringing them about. Last September the East German Government, with Soviet support, made a similar proposal which was rejected by the Adenauer government.

Recent indications of continued Soviet intransigence are Malik's cavalier rejection on 5 April of the latest US proposal to the UN Disarmament Commission, the USSR's persistent refusal to make the concessions necessary for an Austrian treaty, and the continued Communist pressure on Berlin, Yugoslavia and Indochina. A reply to the 13 March Western offer on Austria would provide a further test of Soviet willingness to cooperate. None has been forthcoming.

The current biological warfare propaganda campaign has among its objectives the moral isolation of the United States from its allies. In this respect it has the same aim as the "peace offensive" and, although aggressive rather than peaceful in tenor, can be conducted simultaneously with it.

Meanwhile, signs of a "peace offensive" of long duration can be seen in the scheduling of a Moscow religious conference for early May and a World Peace Council session in June, and the proposal to establish a permanent international economic organization, possibly parallel to the World Peace Council.

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Intensified Communist "peace" pronouncements so far represent an attempt to achieve a favorable climate for the USSR's German strategy, including its call for early four-power negotiations and its campaign against Western rearmament and export controls. However, if the Kremlin is preparing to permit a truce settlement in Korea, these moves may also have the purpose of rationalizing a diplomatic retreat and of fostering an attitude of mind in the West which could be exploited subsequent to the truce.

On some occasions in the past when adverse circumstances forced the Soviet Union into limited concessions in a specific area, they were accompanied by a broad "peace" campaign. Last year when the USSR initiated peace negotiations on Korea, Malik stressed to visiting Quakers the Soviet Union's readiness to negotiate on major international issues; an Englishlanguage publication emphasizing "cooperation and friendship" was set up in Moscow; the article by British Foreign Secretary Morrison was printed in Pravda; and the Soviet Union accepted a long-standing invitation to attend UN-sponsored discussions on improving East-West trade.

The recent extensive progress in Western defense efforts has necessitated a more elaborate and energetic Soviet countereffort. Politically, the Soviet moves are calculated to support an attempt to counteract new impetus given to the Western rearmament program by the February agreements in London and Lisbon. Western progress in both 1948 and late 1950 toward integrating Western Germany also evoked Soviet counteraction. Western initiatives in the fall of 1951 to strengthen NATO and set up a Middle East command were followed by an intense diplomatic protest campaign by the Soviet Union and the Satellites.

In the economic field, the Moscow Conference represents a culmination of Soviet efforts to mobilize popular resistance to Western export control policies. Soviet propaganda concerning East-West trade now far surpasses the last peak reached during the 1951 summer "peace offensive."

Communist proposals so far do not point to a basic shift in Soviet foreign trade strategy. These proposals call for greatly expanded East-West trade but consistently include items on Western export control lists. Although well-tailored to appeal to the economic needs of various foreign business interests, these offers are nonetheless indicative of the same Soviet attitude revealed at governmental trade meetings, where the USSR has frequently proposed that East-West trade could be increased, but only if the West would return to the unrestricted policies reflected in 1948-1950 trade agreements. The Soviet Orbit has consistently refused to make genuine contributions to UN efforts to increase East-West trade.

Stalin's claims of readiness to negotiate on East-West problems, including German unification, fit into the pattern of past attempts of the USSR to build up public pressure for a renewal of four-power negotiations.

